Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

The State of Utah v. Jeffrey Dee Almy : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S. Fujino; Roger K. Scowcroft; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Almy, No. 940674 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6292

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY DEE ALMY,

Case No. 940674-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B), 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and
58-37-8(2) (b) (ii), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis,
Judge, presiding.

RONALD S. FUJINO
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorney for Appellee

FILED
^ a h Court of Appeals

JAN 3 0 19S5

QHOlpJ!:

Marilyn M. Branch
c,e
*_Q?.fi!S.CQui*.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY DEE ALMY,

Case No. 940674-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4 (2) (b) (iii) (B) , 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) , and
58-37-8(2) (b) (ii), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis,
Judge, presiding.

RONALD S. FUJINO
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellee

84114

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

2

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . .

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
THE OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE NOT JUSTIFIED AT ITS
INCEPTION AND WERE EXCESSIVE IN SCOPE.
A. POLICE ACTION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL TRESPASS

9

1. The State Did Not Establish a
Prima Facie Case; There Was Inadequate
Notice.

10

2. Sorting Through Abandoned Garbage
in a Dumpster Does Not Constitute
Substantial Interference.

11

3. Property Open to the Public
Includes Abandoned Garbage in a
Dumpster.

11

B. DEPUTY LATHAM EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE
PERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE
CONCLUSION

8

16
22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)

8, 20

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)

12, 14, 15

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

16

State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276 (Utah App.
1992)

19, 20, 21

State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991)

16

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)

8, 9, 16,
18, 19, 21

State v. Montoya, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1994) .

7

State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1990) . . .

2

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

2

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988)

....

Steele v. Beinholt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1987) . .
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
United States
1973) (per
United States
1979) (per

7
12, 13, 14
8

v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.
curiam)
v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir.
curiam)

16, 17, 18
11

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Or.Rev.Stat. § 164-205(4) (1983)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1302

1, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-79

1, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (2) (b) (iii) (B)
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)

1, 3, 10
1, 3

ii

Page
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (ii)

1, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204

1, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-205

1, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206

1, 9, 10,
11, 13, 14,
15, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-5

1, 17

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15

1, 18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f)

1

Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a)

1

U.S. Const. Amend. IV

1, 9, 16,
21

iii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JEFFERY DEE ALMY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940674-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2) (f), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) .

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
U.S.

Code Ann. § 41-la-1302
Code Ann. § 41-6-79
Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2) (b) (iii) (B)
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(ii)
Code Ann. § 76-3-105
Code Ann. § 76-3-204
Code Ann. § 76-3-205
Code Ann. § 76-6-204
Code Ann. § 76-6-206
Code Ann. § 77-7-5
Code Ann. § 77-7-15
Const. Amend. IV

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.
suppress?

Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Almy's motion to
If two persons do nothing more than rummage through an

unlocked and accessible garbage dumpster situated in a public alley,
is an officer's detention of both persons unjustified and
inadequately based on the alleged minor infraction of criminal
trespass?
"In considering the trial court's action in denying
defendant's motion to suppress, we will not disturb its factual
evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous.

However, in

assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual
findings, we afford it no deference but apply a 'correction of error
standard.'"

State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990);

see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994) ("We conclude
that the proper standard of review to be applied to a trial court
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to
reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a fact
determination reviewable for clear error").
2.

Assuming the initial detention was not improper, was the

resulting detention excessive and unreasonable and justifiable only
through the benefit of hindsight?

If the initial basis for a

detention is an infraction, does an officer act unreasonably by
continuing the detention for a warrants check when such a check
admittedly has no relationship to the underlying charge and is done

- 2

-

merely with the hope of uncovering information which can be used to
justify the continued nature of the detention?

The standard of

review for issue one also applies here.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION
The case at bar presents two issues novel to our state.
Although a United States Supreme Court opinion has implicitly
touched upon a matter relevant to Mr. Almy's situation, Utah's
appellate courts should address directly whether rummaging through
garbage is an act of criminal trespass.

In addition, Utah case law

has not considered the excessive scope argument as it relates to
infractions.

Unlike intrusions based on suspected felonies or

misdemeanors (e.g. traffic stops), case law does not specifically
address whether the initial detention for an infraction may be
prolonged further by an officer who has no reason to suspect
wrongdoing but nonetheless initiates a warrants check in hopes of
finding something outstanding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2) (b) (iii) (B),
58-37-8(2) (a) (i) , 58-37-8(2) (b) (ii) , in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Leslie A. Lewis, presiding.

On July 11, 1994, Mr. Jeffery Dee Almy

entered a guilty plea to the above offense, conditioned upon his
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right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
(R 41-47, 142-60) (plea proceedings, dated July 11, 1994); see also
(R 73-131) (suppression proceedings, dated May 5, 1994).
On October 7, 1994, following a continuance of the time set
for sentencing, (R 55, 57), the court sentenced Mr. Almy to a term
of zero-to-five years in prison, together with a $5,000 fine and an
85% surcharge.

(R 169). The sentence was immediately stayed and

Mr. Almy was instead placed on three years probation.

(R 58-59;

169-74).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 14, 1993, Officer Cory Latham was in the area
of 4151 South Redwood Road, near the Savers store, "a second-hand
type of a store" alongside a row of businesses.

(R 74-76; Motion to

Suppress Transcript, dated May 3, 1994 [hereinafter "MS"] at 5-7).
Behind Savers, a mercantile establishment open to the public, is a
roadway through which cars freely travel to and from other
locations.

(R 88-89; MS 19-20).

Near the row of businesses, in an area approximately ten to
twelve feet behind the wall of Savers, is a thirty-foot long and six
or seven-foot deep dumpster.

(R 75-76, 90; MS 6-7, 21).

Officer

Latham believed that Savers used the dumpster "to discard their
items from their store into."

(R 76; MS 7 ) . The officer, however,

did not know who actually owned the dumpster, (R 89; MS 20), which
may have been one of many receptacles used to remove discarded
merchandise.

(R 76, 86; MS 7, 17). The dumpster apparently was not

the type of bin used for food garbage.
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(R 76; MS 7 ) .

"Clothing,

broken appliances, stuff of that nature" are examples of discarded
items found in or around the dumpster.
is not locked and it has no top.

(R 89; MS 20) .

The dumpster

(R 94; MS 25).

"No trespassing" and "no scavenging" signs were posted on
the wall of the Savers store above a loading dock area, (R 76, 84;
MS 7, 15), possibly in reference to discarded items located on the
Savers dock or on the ramp leading up to the dock.
However, no such signs were on the dumpster itself.

(R 89; MS 20).
(R 84, MS 15).

Officer Latham noticed two individuals standing inside the
accessible dumpster at about 11:35 p.m., on December 14.
MS 6-7) .

(R 75-76;

Latham asked them to step out of the open garbage bin and

requested their identification.
complied.

(R 81; MS 12). Both individuals

(R 81; MS 12) (one person was not identified by name; the

other person was Jeffery Almy).
The officer pointed out four signs on the wall of Savers,
ten to twelve feet away from the dumpster, which evidently had led
Latham to believe that "they couldn't be back there in the
dumpster."

(R 90, 92; MS 21, 23). However, Officer Latham declined

to cite either person for the alleged infraction of rummaging
through garbage.

(R 92; MS 23) (the alleged infraction, criminal

trespass, was the citable offense).

Instead, the officer detained

both persons and radioed dispatch for a warrants check.

Latham

admitted that such a check had nothing to do with them being in the
dumpster.

(R 82, 93; MS 13, 24).
The warrants check produced nothing on the first

individual, who then was released.
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(R 92; MS 23). Since the second

-

individual, Jeffery Almy, "had a $600 warrant of arrest", the
officer handcuffed him and transported him to the jail.
28).

(R 97; MS

During the booking process, two small containers containing

drugs were discovered in Almy's jacket.

(R 98-99; MS 29-30).

After a motion to suppress proceeding, the trial denied
Mr. Almy's motion and issued the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
1. On December 14, 1993, deputy Latham observed the
defendant standing in a garbage dumpster located in an
alley way behind the Savers Store located at 4154 South
Redwood road. It was 11:35 P.M. and it was dark.
2. The area was posted above the dumpster with "no
trespassing and "no scavenging" signs.
3. The deputy approached the defendant and asked him
what he was doing. The defendant indicated that he was
"rooting" through the dumpster. The deputy asked the
defendant for identification. The defendant provided the
deputy with a Utah Drivers license with the defendant's
name and picture on it.
4. The deputy ran a warrants check on the defendant
which came back in a few minutes with an outstanding
warrant for the defendant's arrest for shoplifting. The
deputy arrested the defendant on the outstanding warrant
and transported him to jail.
5. The defendant was searched at the jail and two
packages of Methamphetamine were recovered from the
defendant's person.
Conclusions of Law
From the foregoing findings of fact the Court hereby
concludes:
1.

The testimony of deputy Latham was credible.

2. The deputies actions resulted in a detention of the
defendant.
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3. The detention was justified because the deputy
personally observed the defendant committing a trespass
violation.
4. The detention of the defendant by deputy Latham was
reasonable, short in duration and limited in scope, and for
a limited purpose and intrusion, to allow the deputies to
run a warrants check on the defendant [and] did not
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that
which was reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of the
defendant or the issuance of a citation.
(R 38-39) (attached as Addendum B ) .
On July 11, 1994, Mr. Jeffery Almy entered a conditional
guilty plea to unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
reserving his right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to
suppress.

See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); State

v. Montoya, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1994).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in concluding that a detention for
criminal trespass, an infraction, was justified by an officer's
sighting of two individuals rummaging through a garbage dumpster.
By statute, it is a defense to criminal trespass if the involved
property is open to the public and the conduct does not
substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property.

Since

the property at issue is garbage, there is neither an owner nor is
there interference.

The garbage dumpster itself is open, unlocked,

and located in a public alley.

The dumpster falls under the "open

to the public" provision, a subsection which has been broadly
interpreted.
The court also erred in not finding that the resulting
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detention was excessive.

After Deputy Latham requested

identification, he should have expressed his concerns or simply
issued a citation and let them go.

Instead, he continued the

interference for a warrants check, a detention which admittedly had
nothing to do with the underlying infraction.

The scope of the

detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances.

The officer's detention exceeded the scope here,

however, as he simply wanted more information of the detained
persons before he was willing to let them go.
ARGOMENT
THE OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE NOT JUSTIFIED AT ITS
INCEPTION AND WERE EXCESSIVE IN SCOPE
"To determine whether a search or seizure is
constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: (1)

Was the

police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2)

Was

the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place'?"
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Utah 1994) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).

To be justified, the officer must

act with a reasonable suspicion, an action "based on specific,
objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests
require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the
seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

Brown

An objective and reasonably based

suspicion must justify both the initial intrusion and the resulting
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detention.

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132-33.

The court here, however, ruled contrary to existing law.
See (R 3 9) (Conclusions of Law, numbers 3 & 4 ) .

In contrast to its

order, the officer's actions were not justified at its inception
and, as discussed below, the scope of the detention was also in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.1
A.

POLICE ACTION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL TRESPASS

The court below concluded that "The detention was justified
because the deputy personally observed the defendant committing a
trespass violation."

(R 39) (Conclusions of Law, number 3 ) . The

pertinent part of the criminal trespass statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-206, states:
(2)

A person is guilty of criminal trespass, if . . .

(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he
enters or remains on property as to which notice
against entering is given by . . .
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come
to the attention of intruders.
(4)
(a)

It is a defense to prosecution under this section:
That the property was open to the public when

1. The involved were preserved. During the motion to
suppress proceeding, defense counsel explained that the officer's
actions were not justified at its inception because "the officer did
not have a reasonable suspicion that criminal trespass was
occurring. The second argument we make is that a warrant check
exceeded the permissible scope of the original detention for
criminal trespass." (R 104; MS 35); see generally (R 104-29; MS
35-60). The inadequacy of the notice was addressed, too. (R 89;
106; MS 20, 37).
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the actor entered or remained; and
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially
interfere with the owner's use of the property.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2), -206(4).
Although not to be encouraged, rummaging through garbage is
an act tolerated by the language of the above statute.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-206 (4) .
1.

The State Did Not Establish a Prima Facie
Case; There Was Inadequate Notice

The court below believed that Mr. Almy's situation fell
under subsection (2) (b) (iii) of the criminal trespass statute.
(R 123; MS 54); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (b) (iii).

For the

subsection to apply, the State must prove the "Posting of signs
reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders."
Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (b) (iii) .

First, because garbage was involved,

Mr. Almy would not be considered an intruder.
& A.3.

Utah Code

See infra Points A.2.

Second, the involved signs were on the wall of the Savers

store, they were not on or in the garbage dumpster.
MS 7, 15) .

(R 76, 84;

Deputy Latham's testimony merely established that Savers

had used the dumpster.

The officer did not know who actually owned

the dumpster nor did he know who owned the right to claim an
intrusion.

(R 89; MS 20). The "no trespassing" and "no scavenging"

signs were a good ten to twelve feet away from the dumpster and
separated from the bin by an alley way.

(R 90, 92; MS 21, 23). The

signs only served as notice for the items left on Savers loading
dock area or the ramp leading up to the dock. (R 89, 106; MS 20, 37).
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Unlike the loading dock and the ramp area -- which Savers rightfully
owned, the discarded garbage and the dumpster were not covered by
the signs.

See infra Points A.2 & A.3.

2.

Sorting Through Abandoned Garbage in a
Dumpster Does Not Constitute Substantial
Interference

"Rooting" through garbage does not substantially interfere
with the owner's use of the property.
§ 76-6-206(4) (b) .

See (R 38); Utah Code Ann.

Importantly, the property at issue is garbage and

the claimed area of trespass is a dumpster in a public alley.
(R 8 9; MS 20); see also infra Point A.3.

The court below

specifically found that Mr. Almy was in a "garbage dumpster located
in an alley way behind the Savers Store . . . "
Fact, number 1) (emphasis added).

(R 38; Finding of

The investigating officer, deputy

Latham, similarly acknowledged that the dumpster was used for
"discard [ed]" items.

(R 76; MS 7 ) . Since the property had been

discarded, it was not being used and there was no owner.

Cf. United

States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
("[T]he act of placing garbage for collection is an act of
abandonment which terminates any fourth amendment protection").
incident occurred at "11:35 P.M. and it was dark."
of Fact, number 1 ) . Businesses were closed.
interference.
3.

The

(R 38; Finding

There was no

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(4)(b).
Property Open to the Public Includes
Abandoned Garbage in a Dumpster

The trial court also failed to recognize that the dumpster
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-- which had no top, was unlocked, and located in an public alley
where cars freely travelled, (R 75, 89, 94; MS 6, 20, 25) -- was in
fact open to the public.

According to the United States Supreme

Court, "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or
at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public."
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).

In addition to plastic garbage bags, the accessibility of

dumpsters located at the side of a public alley was more
specifically alluded to in Greenwood:
It is not only the homeless of the Nation's cities
who make use of others' refuse. For example, a
nationally syndicated consumer columnist has suggested
that apartment dwellers obtain cents-off coupons by
"mak[ing] friends with the fellow who handles the
trash" in their buildings, and has recounted the tale
of "the 'Rich lady' from Westmont who once a week puts
on rubber gloves and hip boots and wades into the town
garbage dump looking for labels and other proofs of
purchase" needed to obtain manufacturers' refunds.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 n.3 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
Rubber gloves and hip boots were not used in Jeffery Almy's
case, but reality cannot ignore the fact that indigent people like
Mr. Almy often take advantage of the accessible nature of dumpsters
to search for "prizes" which others have discarded.

In Utah, the

definition of property "open to the public" has received a broad
interpretation.

See Steele v. Beinholt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah App.

1987) .
In Steele, plaintiff Vietta Steele was charged with criminal
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trespass for refusing to*leave a privately owned nursing home
facility.

The criminal charge, which eventually was dismissed,

remained integral to a civil suit filed by Steele against the
nursing home facility.

Steele, 747 P.2d at 434.

If the facility

could prove criminal trespass, Steele's cause of action failed.

By

comparison, if Steele could prove that she did not trespass, her
lawsuit continued.

Id.

At trial, Steele offered a proposed instruction stating, "It
is a defense to prosecution under this section [criminal trespass]:
(a)

That the property

[facility] was open to the public

(b)

[Steele's] conduct did not substantially interfere with the

owner's use of the property."
§ 76-6-206(4)).

. . . and

_Id. at 434 (quoting Utah Code Ann.

The trial court refused her instruction, however,

on the grounds that the statute did not give her the right to be on
private property.

747 P.2d at 434.

On appeal, this Court reversed.

Finding no such distinction

between public versus private property, the Steele Court held:
We do not agree with the trial court's restricted
interpretation and application of section 76-6-206(4).
If the legislature had intended this statutory defense
to be so limited, the statute could have been drafted
to more clearly reflect such an intent. Rather, we
believe "open to public" to have a broader application,
such as the definition provided by the Oregon state
legislature. Or.Rev.Stat. § 164.205(4) (1983) states:
"Open to the public" means premises which by their
physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or
lack thereof or other circumstances at the time
would cause a reasonable person to believe no
permission to enter or remain is required.
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We therefore conclude "property . . . open to the
public" in section 76-6-206(4) is not limited to
public, i.e. government-owned property.
Steele, 747 P.2d at 434 (construing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(4));
see also id. at 434 (Steele's defense remained viable even though a
prima facie case for criminal trespass had been established).
On occasion, reasonable people search desperately through
trash cans to find something they may have inadvertently thrown
away.

More often than not, "down-and-out" people rummage

intentionally through dumpsters for items inadvertently thrown
away.

Whether disadvantaged or desperate, the "open to the public"

definition encompasses both garbage in trash cans and dumpsters
located in a public alley behind a Savers store.
The Greenwood case also supports Mr. Almy's no trespassing
position from another angle.

The high court

conclude[d] that respondents exposed their garbage to
the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth
Amendment protection. . . . Moreover, respondents
placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose
of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector,
who might himself have sorted through respondents'
trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do
so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage "in an
area particularly suited for public inspection and, in
a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the
express purpose of having strangers take it,"
respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.
Furthermore, as we have held, the police cannot
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been
observed by any member of the public.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41 (citations omitted).
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Of course, Jeffery Almy's situation does not involve a
Fourth Amendment claim of privacy in the garbage.

However, if

instead of Mr. Almy, assume deputy Latham had discovered items in
the dumpster which suggested criminal activity (e.g. receiving
stolen property or "fenced" property).

Would a resulting successful

police investigation be undercut by the officer's initial
discovery?
suppressed.

Such "fruits", under Greenwood, would not be
486 U.S. at 37-41; see also id. at 42 ("of those state

appellate courts that have considered the issue, the vast majority
have held that the police may conduct warrantless searches and
seizures of garbage discarded in public areas").

Moreover, under

Utah's criminal trespass statute, such conduct could not be
considered a trespass because the officer's discovery was in a
dumpster "open to the public" and there was no "interference" with
the owner's use of the property.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(4); cf.

supra Point A.l.
Irrespective of a role-reversal, garbage is garbage.
Mr. Almy's rummaging and an officer's discovery both constitute
permissible conduct because of the accessible and discarded nature
of garbage.

Compare Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 ("Our conclusion that

society would not accept as reasonable respondents' claim to an
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area
accessible to the public is reinforced by the unanimous rejection of
similar claims by the Federal Courts of Appeals") with Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-206(4) ("It is defense to prosecution [of criminal
trespass, an infraction, if] . . . the property was open to the

- 15 -

public . . . [and] [t]he actor's conduct did not substantially
interfere with the owner's use of the property").
The court here erred in concluding that "The detention was
justified because the deputy personally observed the defendant
committing a trespass violation."

(R 38). No trespass occurred.

The detention was not justified.
B.

DEPUTY LATHAM EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE
PERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE

Once "a stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop."

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).

"Both the 'length and

[the] scope of the detention must be "strictly tied to and justified
by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'"
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1127 (quoting State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763
(Utah 1991).

If, as discussed above, Deputy Latham's detention was

not justified at its inception, "the evidence derived from it must
be suppressed."

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134.

Similarly, even assuming

that the initial detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment, if
the scope of the detention also was unjustified or excessive,
evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed.

See id.; cf.

Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764.
In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam), a jaywalking case, the Ninth Circuit expressed its
concern with a police detention which extended beyond "the time
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necessary to obtain satisfactory identification from the violator
and to execute a traffic citation."

I_d. at 91.

Although the stop

itself was justified and the request for identification was proper,
the continued detention of the jaywalker solely for the purpose of
running a warrants check was excessive.

The police "had no

reasonable grounds to be suspicious that there might be a warrant
outstanding against him [the jaywalker.]"

_Id.

Accordingly, the

appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress
the "fruits" resulting from the unreasonable detention.

Id.

Assuming, arguendo, that the initial intrusion here was
justified, deputy Latham then unreasonably continued to detain
Mr. Almy for the unrelated purpose of running a warrants check.
According to the court below, "The detention of the defendant by
deputy Latham was reasonable, short in duration and limited in
scope, and for a limited purpose and intrusion, to allow the
deputies to run a warrants check on the defendant [and] did not
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that which was
reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of the defendant or the
issuance of a citation."

(R 39, Conclusion of Law, number 4 ) .

The court's ruling, however, erroneously claimed that the
detention could continue for the purpose of "effect[uating] the
arrest of the defendant . . . "

(R 39). An arrest cannot be made

for an infraction, however, and continuing the detention for that
purpose falls outside the scope of the initial justification.

Cf.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-5 (a warrant of arrest may only be issued
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for public offenses categorized as felonies or misdemeanors;
infractions are not included).
The court's conclusion also improperly intermingled the
detention necessary for the issuance of a citation with the
detention necessary for running a warrants check.

Under Utah law,

deputy Latham could "demand [an appropriately stopped suspect's]
name, address and an explanation of his actions."
§ 77-7-15.

Utah Code Ann.

The statute, in line with Luckett, allows nothing beyond

such preliminary information absent reasonable cause to believe that
further action is required.

See id.; cf. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135

("existing Fourth Amendment law precludes an officer from extending
the length or scope of a traffic stop to investigate a suspicion of
wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion") (emphasis added); 873 P.2d at 1132

("If

reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise,
the scope of the stop is still limited").
Deputy Latham had no reason to detain Mr. Almy beyond the
time it would take to issue a citation.

When the deputy confronted

Mr. Almy and another unnamed individual in the garbage dumpster,
Latham asked them to get out.

They both complied.

(R 81; MS 12).

When the deputy asked them for identification, they both complied.
(R 81; MS 12). Mr. Almy "provided the deputy with a Utah Drivers
license with [his] name and picture on it."

(R 38; Finding of Fact,

number 3 ) . Deputy Latham did not doubt the validity of the
identification nor did he view the alleged infraction to be very
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serious (the officer released the unnamed individual without issuing
a criminal trespass citation).

(R 92; MS 23).

Instead of merely taking the time to incorporate the
provided information into a citation, the detention continued for no
reason other than, "I [deputy Latham] don't decide what I'm going to
do [i.e. issue a citation or release them] before I get all the
information [from the warrants check.]"

(R 94; MS 25).

In the

deputy's own words, "The warrants check had nothing to do with the
fact that they were trespassing in the dumpster."

(R 93; MS 24).

But see Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("The officers must 'diligently
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary
to detain the defendant") (citations omitted).
The situation in State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276
(Utah App. 1992), is distinguishable from Mr. Almy's case.

In

Figueroa-Solorio, a lone pedestrian in a known crime area violated a
misdemeanor statute when he jaywalked across a busy street.

Having

recently "witness[ed] an incident in which a jaywalker almost cause
a vehicular accident" at about the same location, the involved
police officer(s) knew firsthand that jaywalkers pose a potential
danger to themselves and to the commuting traffic.

See id. at 281

(Orme, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in
part) .

The officers approached the individual, who had gotten into

a parked car, and requested his identification.
responded that he did not have any.

^Id. at 277.
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The jaywalker
The officers had

the person write his name down in a notebook.

The officers then

checked a warrants book in their patrol car and found that the name
given had outstanding warrants.

A computer check verified the

outstanding warrants and a subsequent search revealed drugs.
id.

See

Although the search there was allowed, fundamental differences

exist here.
The constitutionality of "seizures involves a weighing of
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree
to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity
of the interference with individual liberty."
U.S. at 50-51.

Brown v. Texas, 443

In Figueroa-Solorio, the evidence reflected that

jaywalkers not only jeopardize their own safety, they also threaten
or potentially compromise the safety of others.

The gravity of

public concern is served when police attempt to prevent harm to
pedestrians, to passing drivers, and to summoned emergency
personnel.

By comparison, a garbage "rooter" affects no one.

The

public interest is not advanced by seizing the downtrodden.
By statute and classification, Utah's legislature has also
drawn a distinction between the jaywalker in Figueroa-Solorio and a
person stopped for criminal trespass.

Jaywalking is a misdemeanor

offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment.
§§ 41-la-1302; 41-6-79; 76-3-204.

Utah Code Ann.

A criminal trespass allegation

like the one here, however, is viewed only as an infraction with no
possibility of imprisonment.
76-6-206(3).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-205(1);

The less serious nature of an infraction requires less
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intrusive conduct by the*police.

Greater justifications must fuel a

continued detention when infractions are involved.
In Figueroa-Solorio, a lone pedestrian was stopped for
jaywalking although such an offense was left uncharged because of
later developing circumstances.

830 P.2d at 281.

In Jeffery Almy's

case, Mr. Almy and another individual were seen rummaging through a
garbage dumpster.

The unidentified individual was released,

however, despite the alleged trespass violation.

Moreover, because

neither person was cited for their alleged identical conduct, the
public interest was not advanced.

The initial basis for a detention

was never a legitimate concern; it served only to "justify" a
detention which continued even though the officer admittedly did not
"suspect any other criminal conduct [.] "

(R 91; MS 22); cf_. Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1135 ("existing Fourth Amendment law precludes an
officer from extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to
investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the
level of probable cause or reasonable suspicion") (emphasis added).
Finally, in Figueroa-Solorio, the stopped jaywalker did not
have identification and he immediately entered a car.
at 277.

83 0 P.2d

Although a jaywalking citation could have been issued, the

officers there received no verifiable identification.

In addition,

the officers had reason to be concerned about other prospective
driving violations since they knew the defendant had no driver's
license.

By comparison, in Mr. Almy's situation, the officers never

questioned the validity of Jeffery Almy's driver's license -- which
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incidentally contained enough information for a citation.

The

off icers should have allowed Mr. Almy to walk away from the dumpster,
The detention here was neither strictly tied to nor
justified by the inconsequential nature of the infraction.

Because

the continued detention was unreasonable, the fruits should have
been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Almy respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
lower court's order denying his motion to suppress and to remand for
further proceedings.
SUBMITTED this

^0

day of January, 1995.

SRONALD S. PUJITNO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

MOTOR VEHICLE ACT

41-la-1303

41-la-1302. Violations class C misdemeanor.
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless
otherwise provided.

41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right-of-way — Limits on pedestrians.
(1) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a
marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway.
(2) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where there is a pedestrian
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing shall yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles upon the roadway.
(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in
operation, pedestrians may not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.
(4) A pedestrian may not cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless
authorized by official traffic-control devices, and if authorized to cross diagonally, shall cross only as directed by the appropriate official traffic-control
devices.

*8-37-8

(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
intentionally to possess or use a
#
(i) for any person knowingy and J g g J ™ ^ a P v a i i d prescnpcontrolled substance, unless :t w * ^ m e u
^ ^
rf
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authorized by this subsec

76-3-105. Infractions.
(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.

76-3-205. Infraction conviction - Fine, forfeiture, and disqualification.
(1) A nerson convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned but may be
« u bVecttoTfin? forfeSure, and disqualification, or any combination.
« ) WhenevS a p ^ n i s 'convictedtf an infraction and no punishment is
s p S ^ X i r s S may be fined as for a class C misdemeanor.

76-6-206. Criminal trespass.
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person thereon or
damage to any property thereon; or
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for tie
safety of another.
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) Personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone
with apparent authority to act for the owner; or
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders.
(3) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section:
(a) That the property was open to the public when the actor entered or
remained; and
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's
use of the property.

be made.
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the
offense charged is:
(1) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of the
day or night; or
(2) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night
only if:
(a) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the warrant;
(b) the person to be arrested is upon a public highway or in a
public place or a place open to or accessible to the public; or
(c) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in the
regular course of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest.

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the acf of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 941900422FS

Jeffery D. Almy,

Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
This matter was set for hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress on May 3,
1994 in front of the honorable Leslie A Lewis , District Court Judge. The state was
represented by Richard G. Hamp , Deputy County Attorney. The defendant Jeffery D.
Almy was present and represented by his attorney Roger K. Scowcroft. Testimony was
taken and argument was presented to the Court by the State and the defendant. The Court
being fully advised hereby finds the following:
Findings of Fact
1. On December 14,1993, deputy Latham observed the defendant standing in a
garbage dumpster located in an alley way behind the Savers Store located at 4154 South
Redwood road . It was 11:35 P.M. and it was dark.
2. The area was posted above the dumpster with "no trespassing" and "no
scavenging" signs.

3. The deputy approached the defendant and asked him what he was doing. The
defendant indicated that he was "rooting" through the dumpster. The deputy asked the
defendant for identification. The defendant provided the deputy with a Utah Drivers
license with the defendant's name and picture on it.
4. The deputy ran a warrants check on the defendant which came back in a few
minutes with an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest for shoplifting. The deputy
arrested the defendant on the outstanding warrant and transported him to jail.
5. The defendant was searched at the jail and two packages of Methamphetamine
were recovered from the defendant's person.
Conclusions of Law
From the foregoing findings of fact the Court hereby concludes:
1. The testimony of deputy Latham was credible.
2. The deputies actions resulted in a detention of the defendant.

.

3. The detention was justified because the deputy 'observed the defendant
committing a trespass violation.

*

,

~ \ Jl

The detention of the defendant by deputy Latham was reasonable, and the •
a warrants check on the defendant
rfendant dia not significantly extena the

jo ui+*~*»

periocr of detention beyond that which was reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of the
defendant or the issuance of a citation.
Dated this

?%? day of

(7

.1994.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
Approved as to Form:

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for the Defendant
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